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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to present some recent empirical findings 'Concerning the role of 
military expenditures in human capital formation. While the analysis involves all of the Arab 
countries, particular attention was given to the Gulf states. 
The main findings of the study indicate that an important aspect of human capital developm"ent, 
improvements in literacy, has proceeded in a so!Ilewhat unique manner in the Arab world. For these 
countries, improvements in literacy have been much more closely associated with the military par-
ticipation rate than is the case in other parts of the world. While this relationship appears to be 
weakening somewhat, it is still a dominant factor for these countries. 
Introduction 
The question of Middle East military expenditures is probably most frequently 
raised in an international context, relative to such problems or potential probiems 
as the Arab-Israeli dispute or territorial sovereignty in the Horn of Africa. Wheri 
and if any attention is given to the domestic significance of military expenditures, 
it tends to focus on the genera.I concerns for the underdeveloped nature of the 
economies and social structures' of these countries. Since most developing countries 
suffer from capital shortages that hinder rapid economic growth, high levels of 
military spending are seen in terms of capital diverted from civilian investment to 
armaments - from butter to guns. 1 
However, for the oil exporters, particularly the sparsely populated countries in 
the Arabian peninsula, the oil price increase of 1973 has for the most part erased 
the problem of capital shortages. But the ready availability of capital has not 
removed all obstacles to development. Replacing capital shortages are labor shor-
tages, particularly in technologically oriented skill categories, and these new con-
straints have proven as troublesome as the previous capital problems. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of military expenditures in 
human capital formation in the Arab world. Have military expenditures affected 
human resource development in a positive manner? If so, in what sense? Have 
patterns of military expenditure/ human resource development in the Arab world 
differed significantly from those in other developing countries, and, if this is the 
case, have these patterns changed over time? 
• 
The Importance of Human Resources 
The devc!lopment of human resources or human capital formation is an important 
policy objective of governments in less developed countries. The main interest 
shown in the past towards physical capital accumulation leading to high growth 
rates per se has given way to policies which look at a much wider definition of 
the capital or wealth of a nation. There are several reasons for this: 
I. It is now generally agreed that physical capital (or its change - investment) is only one 
of a number of inputs that are required for higher national output. Thus even to achieve 
sustainable high growth rates one needs human capital as an independent factor of production. 
2. There may be cross-productivity effects such that better human capital may also increase 
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the productivity of the physical capital stock. 
3. It is increasingly clear that growth and development cannot be automatically equated with 
each other. The trickle-down effect, whereby higher growth rates would automatically and 
within the medium term affect the poorer and more deprived sections of society, does not 
seem to have materialized in many countries.2 . 
One of the major ways in which human capital accumulation can be stimulated 
in developing countries is through public education expenditure as well as govern-
ment spending on health and other social services. Clearly, governments are by 
far the most important agencies in this area and can do much more than private 
enterprises could ever hope to achieve. 
Government initiative in this area has expanded in recent years with Arab 
countries as a whole increasing their educational expenditures as a percent of GNP 
from 3.87 in 1974 to 5.08 by 1984. The corresponding figures for non-Arab countries 
were 3.33 percent and 4.01 percent. Health expenditures have not shown such a 
dramatic increase, however, increasing in the Arab countries from 1.39 percent of 
GNP in 1974 to 1.59 in 1984. A similar pattern was observed in the non-Arab 
countries where health expenditures increased from 1.32 to 1.62 percent of GNP 
over the 1974-84 decade. 
On the other hand, the governments of developing countries also have extremely 
strong commitments to military expenditure to bolster security and counter threats. 
Aggregate defense expenditure is almost always state-induced and the consumption 
of scarce resources to support the military as well' as reallocation of valuable inputs 
into armaments productions must generally be provided for in national budgets. 
In terms of general magnitudes Arab countries expanded their military expenditures 
as a share of GNP from 7.87 percent in 1974 to 12.39 percent by 1984. Militarization 
in the non-Arab countries was not nearly as dramatic, with defense expenditures 
increasing from 3.01 to 3.72 percent.of GNP over the corresponding time period. 
Military Expenditures and Budgetary Trade-offs 
It is clear that education and health expenditure to foster human capital and 
defense spending to assure security are both major publicly provided goods in less 
developed countries and need state participation to function effectively. On the 
surface, budgetary tradeoffs between defense and allocations to education/health 
would seem to be straightforward - for a given budget a dollar increase in military 
expenditure will crowd out an equivalent amount of all other spending, and edu-
cation and health will be reduced according to their proportion of the total. Recent 
research has shown that this view of the budgetary process is simplistic and does 
not conform with the manner in which governments often chose to prioritize 
expenditures. J 
Econometric results reported by Deger4 show that there exist a large number 
of simultaneous channels by which these effects and counter-effects operate and 
the final causality is not clear cut. Along somewhat different lines, a recent exam-
ination of budgetary tradeoffs between third world arms producers and those 
without an indigenous arms industrys found that when increasing the share of the 
budget allocated for defense, arms producers tended to im;rease the share of edu-
cation, health, roads and other activities likely to increase the overall rate of 
economic growth. Non-arms producers, however, tended to cut a disproportionate 
number of growth enhancing allocations to accommodate expansions in the military 
budget. The net impac! for these countries was lower overall growth. 
A related issue, and one of significant relevance for the Gulf States in the post 
1982 era of fiscal austerity, is the manner in which austerity-driven budgetary cuts 
are allocated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that officials follow ad hoc rules for 
making large contractions in a short period of time - cutting new rather than 
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ongoing projects, new rather than present employment, materials and travel 
expenses rather than personnel, and favoring ministries that are politically powerful 
or reducing those that expanded most rapidly in the past.6 
Along these lines some sectors are often thought to be more vulnerable than 
others to reductions; social sectors, in· particular are usually considered more and 
defense sectors less susceptible. 
In general, 1 programs once enlarged seem difficult to reduce, particularly if they 
generate large employment benefits. As to the choice of which sector to cut back, 
it is often felt that some sectors are more 'vulnerable' than others to reductions. 
The defense sector, in particular, is usually considered difficult to reduce, while 
other sectors, particularly the social sectors such as health, education and rural 
development, are considered vulnerable. The alleged vulnerability of the social 
sectors is clearly evident in the publications of the World Bank: 
In the difficult past few years, budgetary crises have often meant that social services were 
cut back in the process of unravelling carefully designed programs.s 
Since many human development programs are publicly funded, they are especially vulnerable 
when growth is threatened and budgets are under pressure ... The recurrent costs of scrcial 
programs, especially salary costs tended to make them a permanent and, therefore, vulnerable 
part of government budgets.9 
Quick fix relief through disproportionate cutbacks - for example in education or rural devel-
opment - may have negative consequences for the entire economy.10 
Many member countries have had to reduce and reorient investment programs to curtail 
recurrent expenditures and to delay the completion of high priority development projects. 
Programs in health, education and other social sectors have been particularly vulnerable.II 
In the crisis situations confronting African governments, education, training and health pro-
grams are continuously in danger of becoming the residual legatees of both resources and 
of attention by policy-makers. 12 
Despite these rather strongly held views and such extensive circumstantial evi-
dence, little empirical investigation has been made on the vulnerability of different 
sectors to reductions in public expenditures. One studytJ that did focus on this 
problem examined 37 cases of budgetary reductions (countries where real expen-
ditures declined in one or more years). Here vulnerability was loosely defined as: 
1. A sector was well-protected if expenditures on it were reduced by less than 
the percent of reduction in total expenditures. 
2. A sector was vulnerable if its percentage of reduction exceeded the average. 
In brief, a simple ratio of percentage changes in sectoral expenditures to those 
in total spending served as the measure of vulnerability. When the ratio had a 
greater value than one, it indicated that the sector was highly vulnerable, while 
a value between zero and one'ir,dicated low vulnerability with less than proportional 
reductions in the relevant rate. A negative value indicated that despite overall 
expenditure reductions, the sector was allowed to expand. 
The main findings of this study showed an average decline of 13% in real 
government expenditures, while the decline for the social sectors was only 5%, 
producing a vulnerability index of 0.4. By contrast, the index is 0.6 for adminis-
trative/ defense sectors and over 1.0 for production and infrastructure. In short, 
social sectors were less vulnerable to cuts than defense and administration, which 
in turn were considerably less vulnerable than production and infrastructure - a 
finding quite contrary to the generally accepted view. 
The fact that social sectors and defense were both relatively protected suggests 
that there were high political costs associated with reducing them. On the other 
hand, countries appeared to have been more willing to cut spending on infrastruc-
ture and production which, of course, are likely to have adverse implications for 
longer term growth prospects, but few early, direct and immediate costs. 
This picture has been recently confirmed by McKinlay14 who found that there 
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was no evidence that third world military expenditures are responsive to govern-
ment financial constraints of a short or long term variety. 
In this respect, then, we infer that military expenditure has a life largely independent of central 
financial constraints, indicative therefore on its part of a substantial degree of autonomy. 15 
With regard to budgetary priorities, McKinlay found that while a substantial 
commitment was made by Third World countries to the growth and expansion of 
education and health expenditure, that commitment was not nearly as high as in 
the area of military expenditure. In this respect, military expenditure was generally 
taken to be a higher priority. 
Finally, McKinlay found that Third World countries as a whole move their 
education and health expenditures in a much narrower band than their military 
expenditure. From this, he again concluded that military expenditure had a greater 
independence or autonomy of movement. The greater harmony or synchronization 
between budget size and education/health expenditures could not be~explained in 
terms of the size of education/ health as opposed to military expenditure. From 
this he concluded: t6 
We are inclined to that argument that the lower level of synchronization of military expenditure 
with budget is a reflection again of the greater independence of military expenditure. Third 
World governments are more inclined to move education and health expenditures in line with 
overall budget expansions and contractions. This leads us to infer that education-health expen-
diture is a rather more stable component of general government expenditure than military 
expenditure, which though of course ultimately entirely constrained by budget expenditure 
does show greater freedom or latitude in its movement . . . Although military expenditures 
does seem to attract some special priority and enjoy a greater degree of autonomy, our 
conclusion suggests that military ·expenditure is not detrimental to education or health 
expenditure. 
As noted at the beginning of this section, simple zero sum models of budgetary 
shares are not the appropriate mea.sure of determining the impact that military 
expenditures have on human capital development in developing countries. Ulti-
mately this impact will depend not just on budgetary priorities, but perhaps more 
importantly on the degree of simultaneous expansion in the overall size of the 
economy and the government budget itself. 
Another relevant factor involves the manner in which military expenditures are 
spent - the composition between military hardware and personnel development. In 
fact, the earliest theoristst7 of the role of the armed forces in the development 
process argued that one of the most important ways in which the military estab-
lishment can contribute to economic progress was to relieve the commonly found 
shortages of technical and administrative manpower. ts 
Here, the acquisition of modern weapons was said to bring with it certain benefits 
in terms of technology transfer and technical training. It was argued by the theorists 
that the possession of such weapons made military personnel both more aware of 
the technological gap between industrialized and developing countries and more 
likely to act on this awareness than other social groups. The training received by 
soldiers to enable them to use modern weapons and support equipment was said 
to provide them with those technical skills that are of particular value for economic 
development. 
It is quite possible in regions such as the Middle East, where educational pro-
grams have lagged, that the military also performs a more fundamental task: 
developing basic skills in literacy. Based on the considerations summarized above 
the following section attempts to determine the extent to which military expendi-
tures have affected ed.ucational/ health expenditures and ultimately the development 
of human capital in the Arab world. 
Method of Analysis 
78 
Military Expenditures and Human Capital Development 
hi order to determine the relative impact of military expenditures on various 
facets of socio-economic performance and in particular on human capital devel-
opment in the Arab World,t9 an assessment2o was made of the change in sixteen 
measures of social and economic development over the 1974-84 period. 
The variables included: 
I. Military. (a) armed forces per capita, (b) military expenditure per soldier, 
(c) share of military expenditures in the central government budget2I and 
(d) total military expenditures. 
2. Social Expenditures. (a) educational expenditures, (b) health expenditures, 
(c) share of educational expenditures in the central government budget, and 
(d) share of health expenditures in the central government budget. 
3. Growth Expenditures. (a) physicians per capita, (b) teachers per capita, (c) 
school age population per teacher, (d) literacy rate, (e) percentage of school 
age population in school. 
Main Findings 
The analysis produced several interesting patterns. For growth over the peried 
as a whole: 
I. Overall growth (consisting largely of the growth in income (GNP) and 
population) was the dominant trend in the data. 
2. Human capital development was a clearly defined factor, comprised largely 
of increases in: (a) the percent of school age population in school, (b) 
teachers per capita, (c) educational expenditures, and (d) school age pop-
ulation per teacher. Interestingly enough, expanded literacy was not corre-
lated particularly highly with improvements in human capital. 
3. The major budgetary trade-offs involving defense, education and health 
were largely confined to the negative. relationship between educational and 
defense expenditures. This relationship was fairly weak, however. 
4. In terms of absolute increases in educational expenditures, there was no 
trade-off with allocations to defense. In general, however, the three cate-
gories of government expenditures examined here (defense, education and 
health) expanded at somewhat different rates, with little correlation between 
their patterns of growth over this period. 
5. Relative to non-Arab countries, the Gulf states22 (except for Iran) achieved 
high levels of overall growth. However, Bahrain, Iraq and Kuwait were not 
able to effectively extend their growth successes to improvements in human 
capital. The greatest improvements in human capital were achieved by 
Saudi Arabia and Oman, followed by Iran. However, except for Iran and 
Iraq, the Gulf states were able to achieve above average increases in health 
expenditures. 
The above average attainment of the Gulf States as a group on the expenditure 
and growth suggest that they, and perhaps the Arab world as a whole, have differed 
somewhat from the rest of the world in terms of the nature of the major interre-
lationships between, growth, education/ human capital formation and military 
expenditures. To test this hypothesis, an additional assessment, this time confined 
to the Arab World countries as a group, was undertaken. Here the main findings 
indicated that: 
l. In contrast to the situation characterizing developing countries as a whole, 
the Arab countries expanded each major area of government expenditure 
at a somewhat similar rate. Government expenditures were in fact the 
dominant trend in the Arab country data. Interestingly enough, expansion 
of the public sector was not closely related to overall growth of the economy 
(GNP). 
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2. Despite this fact, educational expenditures (as a share of the government 
budget) appear to have a fairly strong negative relationship with military 
expenditures. Furthermore, the share of defense expenditures in the 
government's budget appears to have expanded at the expense of some 
types of socioeconomic advancement: (a) teachers per capita (but not phy-
sicians), and (b) school age children per teacher. 
3. However, no negative trade-offs between military expenditures and the 
overall change in socio-economic progress are apparent. In absolute terms, 
increases in military expenditures were positively correlated with increased: 
(a) educational expenditures, (b) teachers per capita, and (c) physicians per 
capita. 
4. The Arab countries do not appear to have developed their human capital 
in as consistent a manner as developing countries as a whole, i.e., there 
is no one dimension of the data on Arab countries that can .be called an 
increase in human capital formation. Instead, the percent of school age 
population in school is largely associated with the expansion in public sector 
expenditure, and teachers per capita with overall growth and military 
expenditure. -
5. As with developing countries as a whole, expanded rates of literacy were 
not highly associated with increased levels of funding or teacher/ student 
ratios. In contrast to the developing world as _a whole, however, improve-
ments in literacy in the Arab world were fairly closely associated with 
increases in the military participation rate (the level of military personnel 
per capita). -
As might be imagined because of their numbers, non-Arab countries had more 
in common with developing countries as a whole than their Arab counterparts. 
However, several interesting contrasts with Arab countries are apparent: 
1. In contrast to their Arab counterparts, non-Arab countries have achieved 
a fairly uniform expansion in human capital. Put differently, these countries 
have been able to have fairly uniform expansions in: (a) the percent of 
school age population actually in school, (b) the numbers of teachers per 
capita, and (c) the literacy rate. 
2. While government expenditures were not closely related to increases in 
economic activity in the Arab world, non-Arab countries experienced a 
fairly close relationship between the growth in: (a) educational expenditures, 
(b) total government allocations and (c) GNP. 
3. While both Arab and non-Arab countries experienced stronger budgetary 
trade-offs between defense and education than defense and health, the non-
Arab countries -do not appear to have had improved levels of literacy 
associated with increased military participation rates. Instead, as noted 
above, literacy in the non-Arab countries is fairly closely associated with 
other measures of human capital attainment. 
To sum up, one of the major indicators ef human capital formation in developing 
countries improvement in literacy, occurred through fairly conventional means in 
the non-Arab world. For these countries, increased expenditures on education have 
manifested themselves in more teachers per student and so on, with the ultimate 
effect of improvements in the overall rate of literacy. The Arab countries have 
apparently relied more on instruction within the military service to eradicate illi-
teracy. A corollary to this is that the non-Arab school systems appear to have been 
relatively more adept at contributing to human capital formation than their coun-
terparts in the Arab world. 
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each of the two five year sub-periods are of interest. In terms of growth over the 
1974-79 period: 
1. For the sample as a whole the dominant factor was, as was the case for 
the entire period (1974-84), growth. This factor was largely defined in terms 
of increased income and population. 
2. Similarly, human capital formation was again the second major trend in 
the data. This factor was largely comprised of (a) increases in the percen-
tage of school age population in school, (b) the expansion in central govern-
ment allocations to education, (c) the increase in teachers per capita. 
3. An apparent outcome of increased resources in the educational area was 
an improvement in the overall rate of literacy, although this relationship 
may not be particularly strong. (This relationship was, however, consider-
ably stronger than for the period as a whole). 
4. During this period, expansion in the government's allocations to education 
was fairly closely correlated with the overall expansion of the public sector 
budget. _ 
5. As was the case for the period as a whole, the main budgetary trade-offs 
were between military and educational expenditures. In contrast, health 
expenditures (as a share of the government budget) were not affected to 
any great extent by movements in the other two major areas of public sector 
.allocation. 
6. The military participation rate was not correlated with any of the main 
trends in the data. Increases in the number of soldiers per capita was, 
however, weakly correlated with human capital formation. 
In general, therefore, the pattern that emerges for the 1974-79 period for devel-
oping countries was fairly similar to their experience over the entire 1974-84 period. 
For the Arab countries during the 1974-79 period: 
1. Government expenditures were more closely associated with the overall 
expansion of the economy than was the case for the period as a whole. 
In particular, health expenditures (but not allocations to education) were 
closely associated with both the expansion in GNP and the population. 
2. Whereas the three major types of government expenditures, health, edu-
cation and military, were fairly synchronized over the 1974-84 period, each 
followed a somewhat independent path during the 1974-79 period. In par-
ticular, during 1974-79 there was little similarity in rates of expansion of 
educational and military expenditures. 
3. In terms of budgetary trade-offs, military expenditures expanded at the 
expense of both health and education. At this time, however, expanded 
educational expenditures were fairly highly correlated with military expen-
ditures per soldier. 
4. As with the period as a whole, improvements in literacy were largely 
associated with increases in the military participation rate (as opposed to 
expenditures on education)~ There patterns were stronger than over the 
1974-84 period as a whole. 
As was the case for the period as a whole, several marked contrasts existed 
during 1974-79 between the Arab and non-Arab countries with regard to expen-
diture patterns and socio-economic development. 
l. In contrast to the Arab countries, military expenditure per soldier was 
associated with health expenditures (as opposed to educational 
expenditures). 
2. The relationship between educational expenditures and the overall expan-
sion of government expenditures was much closer than was the case for 
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the Arab countries. 
3. Literacy was again more highly correlated with conventional inputs such 
as teachers, wherea!.: in the Arab countries improvements in literacy were 
much more closely associated with increases in the military participation 
rate. 
4. In contrast to the period as a whole, however, increased educational expen-
ditures were not associated with educational performance (measured in 
terms of literacy, teachers per student and the percent of school age students 
in school). -
With regard to the 1979-85 sub-interval: 
I. The entire sample of developing countries experienced expenditure/socio-
economic development patterns very similar to those experienced during 
the previous five year interval. For developing countries as a group, it 
appears that military participation rates are not associated wit.ii any aspect 
of socio-economic progress. 
2. One important difference concerns the manner in which educational expen-
ditures impact on human capital. In the earlier period, educational expen-
ditures were highly associated with such performance indices as the percent 
of school age population in school, teachers per capita and (to a lesser 
extent) improvements in the rate of literacy. In the latter period, educational 
expenditures were more closely related to· the simple expansion in govern-
ment expenditures and GNP. At this time, there was little association 
between expanded government allocations to education and improvements 
in human capital. 
With regard to differences in expenditure and socio-economic performance in the 
Arab and non-Arab countries: 
l. For the Arab countries military expenditures were the dominant dimension 
in the data. Within this dimension, total government and military expen-
ditures were highly correlated. In contrast, total government expenditures 
expanded with income (GNP and educational expenditures in the non-Arab 
States). 
2. Although literacy was still associated with the military participation rate 
in Arab countries, this relationship did not appear as strong as in the earlier 
period. For the non-Arab countries there was actually a fairly strong 
negative relationship between literacy and the military participation rate. 
3. Human capital formation was, as in the earlier period, a separate dimension 
in the case of non-Arab countries. However, human capital was no longer 
an identifiable factor in the Arab world. More specifically, there was little 
or no relationship in the Arab countries between educational expenditures, 
teachers, school age participation rates and literacy. In fact, there was a 
fairly strong negative relationship between improvements in literacy and 
expanded allocations to education. 
Conclusions 
The findings presented above indicate that an important aspect of human capital 
development, improvements in literacy, has proceeded in a somewhat unique 
manner in the Arab world. For these countries, improvements in literacy have been 
much more closely associated with the military participation rate than is the case 
in other parts of the world. While this relationship appears to be weakening 
somewhat, it is still a dominant factor for these countries. 
Having said this, the reason for this pattern is not completely clear. Are the 
observed improvements in literacy associated with military participation due to 
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simlJly reflect deficiencies in the civilian educational systems? Would comparable 
allocations to conventional schools have produced better attainment towards 
national literacy and skill improvement? While the results obtained above are 
suggestive, definitive answers to questions of this sort will have to wait until detailed 
analysis of the region's military and educational budgets can be undertaken. 
In an earlier study, Erich Weede23 found that in the sixties and seventies, nations 
with higher skill levels, as indicated by school enrollment ratios, grew faster than 
others. In addition he found that nations with better social discipline, as indicated 
by military participation ratios, also grew faster than others. While these patterns 
were not found in the analysis above, it appears that one important aspect of 
military participation in the Arab world is its potential to contribute to future 
growth and development. Put differently, while the conventional analysis that tends 
to view military and educational expenditures as competing for resources may be 
correct, ih fact, it may be somewhat beside the point at least as far as the Arab 
world is concerned. In the longer term, the skills learned and the levels of improved 
literacy gained in military service may pay high dividends in terms of enabling the 
labor force to play a more direct role than in the past in contributing to national 
economic growth. 
NOTES 
I. John Thomas Cummings, Hossein G. Askari and Michael Skinner, "Military Expenditures and 
Manpower Requiremeuts in the Arabian Peninsula", Arab Studies Quarterly (Winter 1980), p.38. 
2. Saadet Deger, Military Expenditure in Third World Countries: The Economic Effects (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p.112. 
3. Deger, op. cit., p.113. 
4. Saadat Deger, "Human Resources, Education and Military Expenditures in Developing Coun-
tries", paper presented at the 2nd World Congress of Social Economics, Jerusalem, August 1981. 
5. Robert E. Looney, "Budgetary Impacts of Third World Arms Production'', International Journal 
of Public Administration, (1988), pp.601-623. 
6. Cf. N. Caiden and A. Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries (New York: John 
Wiley, 1974). 
7. A thorough analysis of these conditions are given in R. Goode, Government Finance in Developing 
Countries (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1984). 
8. The World Bank, IDA in Retrospect (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 1983), p.52. 
9. The World Bank, World Development Report, 1981 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 
pp.97-98. 
IO. World Bank, Focus on Poverty, 1983 (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 1983). 
II. World Bank, World Bank Program on Special Assistance to Member Countries (Washington: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1984), p.I. 
12. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress Report of Development Prospects and Programs 
(Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1983). 
13. N. Hicks and A. Kubisch, "Cutting Government Expenditures in LDCs", Finance and Devel-
opment (September 1984), pp.37-39. 
14. Robert McKinlay, Third World Militar'y Expenditure: Determinants and Implications (London: 
Frances Pinter, 1989). 
15. Ibid., p.35. 
16. Ibid., p.37. 
17. For example, Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chi-
cago: Phoenix Books, 1964, p.75; and Marion J. Levy, Jr. Modernization and the Structure of 
Societies: A Setting for International Affairs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 
p.605. 
18. This discussion is based on Nicole Ball, 'The Contribution of Military Training to Human Capital 
Formation in the Third World,' paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-
University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 18-20 October 1985, Chicago, Illinois, p.I. 
83 
Robert E. Looney 
19. 1984 was the latest date for which complete and comprehensive data was available. National 
income account data is from: Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-
85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). Social data was from: Ruth Sivard, World Military 
and Social Expenditures (Washington: World Priorities), various issues. Here Arab countries 
included: Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, Iraq, 
Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Yemen Arab Republic, 
PDR Yemen. For comparison, the results for Iran are presented in the factor scores. 
20. The method used was factor analysis. An in depth description of the method, together with a 
full presentation of the results are given in Robert E. Looney "Military Expenditures, Military 
Participation Rates, and Human Capital Development in the Arab World", Working Paper, 
Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, May 5, 1989. Copies are 
available from the author upon request. 
21. Here defined to include health, education and military expenditures. 
22. Based on factor scores which provide an index of the relative ranking of each country in terms 
of its attainment of each of the major dimensions in the data. Scores above zero indicate greater 
than average attainment, while negative scores indicate less than average values.for that factor. 
23. Erich Weede, "Military Participation Ratios, Human Capital Formation, and Economic Growth: 
A Cross-National Analysis'', Journal of Political and Military Sociology (Spring 1983), pp.11-
20. 
Address for correspondence: Professor Robert E. Looney, Department of National Security Affairs, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 93943, USA. 
84 
